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INTERNATIONAL LAW-JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY OF UNITED NA-

TIONS EMPLOYEES-THE GuBITCHEV CASE-Diplomatic officers are
immune from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state under wellrecognized principles of customary international law, which principles
are said to be a part of the law of the United States.1 As international
organizations developed, certain privileges and immunities were given
to their personnel by treaties or agreements and it appeared that by
common consent of the family of nations their right to immunities
might also come to be recognized as a principle of the law of nations. 2
As yet the United States has not recognized such a principle3 and jurisdictional immunity here must still be provided for in the charter of the
international organization or other agreement.
,
The Guhitchev case raised problems both of diplomatic immunity
and of the related immunities of United Nations personnel in an
unusual way. Gubitchev, a Russian diplomat, was appointed Third
Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, and
was sent to the United States in 1946 on a diplomatic passport stamped
with a diplomatic visa to accept a position in the United Nations Secretariat. He did not come as an emissary to the United States, was
never attached to the Soviet embassy, and never performed diplomatic
functions. After his appointment in the Secretariat, Gubitchev was
listed by the State Department pursuant to the International Organizations Immunities Act, 4 but his name was never submitted for inclusion
on the diplomatic list under the Headquarters Agreement:> He was
arrested March 4, 1949 for violation of the espionage laws and convicted after the court had twice considered and rejected the claims of
diplomatic immunity made by Gubitchev and by the Russian Government on his behalf. 0 The court held that none of the applicable agreements_ between the United States and the United Nations granted
1 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF brrERNATIONAL LA.w 515-532 (1942); Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 20 S.Ct. 290 (1900).
2 See generally Hu.L, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OF !NTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS
(1947); Preuss, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities of International Agents," 25 AM..
J. brr. L. 694 (1931).
·
8 Principal case, 84 F. Supp. 472 at 476 (1949).
4 59 Stat. L. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. (1946) §288; Exec. Order No. 9698, 11 Fed.
Reg. 1809 (1946).
Ii P.L. 357, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 61 Stat. L. 756 (1947).
6 See N.Y. TxMEs, March 8, 1950, p. l :6. Gubitchev's sentence was suspended on
condition that he waive his right to appeal from the conviction, and that he be deported
immediately. MxcH. DAILY, March 10, 1950, p. 1:2. Cf. news item in PRAVDA, March 10,
1950: "[B]ecause of the collapse of the unfounded charges advanced against Gubitchev, the
court recommended that Gubitchev leave for USSR within 2 weeks." 5 Sov. PREss TRANs.,
April 1, 1950, p. 223.
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immunity and that the "dispositive fact" was the certification of the
State Department that Gubitchev did not enjoy diplomatic immunity.
United States v. Coplon and Gubitchev, (D.C. N.Y. 1949) 84 F.
Supp. 472, 88 F. Supp. 915 (1950).
In his opinion on the first order denying·immunity, Judge Rifkind
considered the United Nations Charter,7 the International Organizations Immunities Act and the Headquarters Agreement and found that
none of them conferred immunity on Gubitchev, a conclusion which
the defendant later conceded. On re-argument before Judge Ryan the
defendant contended that his "diplomatic" status and mission entitled
him to diplomatic immunity under the law of nations; moreover, that
the United States had guaranteed his diplomatic immunity by granting
him a diplomatic visa, and that the determination of the State Department to the contrary did not bind the court in this instance.8 This
comment will be limited to a brief discussion of these issues.

I.

Diplomatic Immunity of Persons on Non-Diplomatic Missions

Diplomatic immunity is a limited exception to the general rule of
territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of states. It does not result from
the fiction of exterritoriality, nor primarily from the courtesy extended
to a representative of another sovereign state. Diplomatic immunity is
based simply on the necessity that envoys be independent of the jurisdiction of the receiving state in order to fulfill their duties freely. 0 It
has even been suggested that, "If the representative is called upon by
his own sovereign to perform functions other than those of maintaining relations with the sovereign to whom he is accredited, the purpose
with which the latter acquiesces in his non-subjection to the local
jurisdiction ceases to operate in respect of those functions."10 As a
matter of general international practice, receiving states effectively
limit the number of persons possessed of diplomatic immunities to those
7 Art. 105, 59 Stat. L. 1031 (1945).
s Brief for Defendant, Crim. No. 129-158, p. 7.
o See Harvard Research on International Law, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities," 26 AM. J. INT. L. 19, 26 (1932 Supp.); OGDON, BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY,
166-194 (1936); Preuss, "Capacity for Legation and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic
Immunities," IO N.Y. Univ. L.Q. 170, 181-2 (1932).
10 Hurst, "Diplomatic Immunities-Modern Developments," 10 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 1,
4 (1929). But see 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d rev. ed., 1231 (1945), to the effect
that American diplomatic officers burdened with non-diplomatic duties do not lose their
diplomatic character. To terminate the immunities of an accredited diplomat, a state must
give notice and a reasonable time for his departure.
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whose duties require this independence by requiring acceptance of the
envoy as a condition to his continued enjoyment of diplomatic status.
They may also condition the grant of immunity on the publication of
the envoy's name in a diplomatic list.11 In the absence of special treaty
provisions or other special circumstances, a non-accredited foreign
official may not claim diplomatic immunity unless he is engaged in
recognized diplomatic functions. 12
Strictly speaking, the officers of the United Nations and the represen,tatives of its member nations are not "diplomats" and perform no
diplomatic functions. 13 The United States has, therefore, refused to
recognize any principle of the law of nations which entitles them to
jurisdictional immunity.14 Our government has implemented its obligation as a signatory to the Charter of the United Nations by conferring
immunity on representatives, officials and employees for acts done in
their official capacity,1 6 and immunity equal to diplomatic immunity
on certain resident representatives of member nations.16 The United
Nations apparently does not claim or want more extensive immunities.17 • Even assuming, as the defendant daimed, that dignitaries of
international organizations possessed diplomatic immunity under cus11 Harvard Research on International Law, ''Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities,"
26 AM. J. lNr. L. 19, 76-77 (1932 Supp.).
12 In Engelke v. Musmann, [1928] A.C. (H.L.) 433, a consular secretary was
accorded immunity because the British Foreign Office certified that he was working in a
diplomatic capacity. See 2 HYDE, lNTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d rev. ed., 1230-1234 (1945).
Cf. Harvard Research on International Law, "Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities," 26
AM. J. INT. L. 43-45 (1932 Supp.) which does not attempt a precise definition of diplomatic functions and indicates that the distinction is more formal than functional. Military,
naval, and commercial attaches are not actually diplomatic officers but perform diplomatic
functions and are entitled to immunity on this ground. See 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
lNTERNATIONAL LAW 401-405 (1942).
18 Harvard Research on International Law, ''Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities," 26
AM. J. INT. L. 19, 43 (1932 Supp.); Kunz, "Privileges and Immunities of International
Organizations,'' 41 AM. J. INT. L. 828, 841 (1947); 1 OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 7th ed., 703-705, 734-740 (1948). But cf. "Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers," 22 AM. J. INT. L. 142 (1928 Supp.).
14 4 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF lNTERNATIONAL LAW 422-3 (1942). Although the
opinion was limited to "officials" or "agents,'' Judge Rifkind in the principal case construed it to include "representatives." 84 F. Supp. 472 at 476.
15 International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. L. 669 at §7 (b). Gubitchev's
act of espionage was obviously not performed in his official capacity, or he would have been
entitled to the protection of the act.
10 Headquarters Agreement, 61 Stat. L. 756 at §15.
17 See United Nations Charter, Alt. 105: "Repr~entatives ..• and officials ..• shall
similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions .•••" Both Mr. Lie and Mr. Hov stated that Gubitchev was not entitled to immunity. N.Y. TIMEs, March 8, 1949, p. 3:3; March 13, 1949, p. 1:6.
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·tomary international law, it might be argued that the two agreements
under which immunity is granted simply restate existing principles;18
or, if_ there is a conllict, that the explicit provisions of the agreements
prevail in United States courts.19 Furthermore, the right to claim or
waive immunity belongs to the organization itself, not to the officer
or employee.20
·
The claim of Gubitchev was anomalous. He claimed· diplomatic
status and immunity because of his original appointment by the
U .S.S.R.,21 and explained his non-accreditation by the United States
and his non-association with a diplomatic mission by the fact that he
was sent to the United Nations, not to our government. But diplomatic
immunity of non-accredited persons is the result of functional necessity, and Gubitchev claimed neither diplomatic nor international functions which would warrant his being granted immunity,, even as a
courtesy, in the absence of applicable treaty provisions. In essence he
claimed that Russia could create diplomatic privileges and immunities
in the United States simply by characterizing Gubitchev a "diplomat"
and sending him to work in the United NatiC?ns, regardless of his
actual duties. Neither the United Nations nor the United States
recognizes such a broad and potentially dangerous power in member
nations, all of whom agreed to the charter limitation to "such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
• ..•."22
functton
18 The ''Modus Vivendi" between the League of Nations and Switzerland provided for
immunity from civil and penal jurisdiction for top officials and immunity for official acts
for officials of the second category. Art. VII (1926), unofficial translation in HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES OP lNTEnNAnONAL OPPICIALS 138 (1947). See 46 Mica L.
REv. 381 (1948).
10 The Over the Top, (D. C. Conn. 1925) .5 F (2d) 838~ 842; 1 OPPENHEIM-LAUTER·
PAGHT, lNTERNAl'IONAL LAW, 7th ed., 40, (1948). Treaties are construed. if possible to
conform to principles of international Jaw. 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OP lNTERNAnoNAL LAw
230-1 (1942).
20 City of New Rochelle v. Page-Sharp, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 290 (1949), 44 AM. J. INT.
L. 418 (1950). See International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. L. 669 at
§7 (h); Convention on Privileges and Immunities of United Nations, §§14, 20 (1946).
The United States has not acceded to the Convention, except as referred to in the Headquarters Agreement, 61 Stat. L. 756 at §26.
21 Principal case, 88 F. Supp. 915 at 917. Gubitchev claimed that retention of his
position in the Russian diplomatic service was not inconsistent with acceptance of employment on United Nations staff. A United Nations spokesman stated that this dual status
was possible. N.Y. TIMBS, DEc. 6, 1949, p. 7:2.
·
22 United Nations Charter, Art. 105 (2), 59 Stat. L. 1031 (1945).
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IL Eflect of Grant of Diplomatic Visa on Right to Diplomatic
·

Immunity

Probably the most substantial argument advanced by the defendant
on re-argument concerned the diplomatic visa granted to Gubitchev
by the American embassy in Russia. It was contended that Gubitchev's
diplomatic passport proved his diplomatic character and gave notice
thereof to the United States, and that our government had guaranteed
recognition here of that status and immunity by granting him the visa.23
Judge Ryan held, however, that the visa did not of itself constitute a
grant of diplomatic immunity, because the Regulations provide for
issuance to non-diplomatic persons.24 The State Department has a
practice of extending diplomatic privileges and immunities to some nondiploma_tic persons as a matter of courtesy.25 Quite possibly the Regulations were simply intended to list all persons who might be extended
diplomatic immunity either as a courtesy or as a right under international law. In the absence of a declaration of the State Department
as to the status of particular individuals the practice provided by the
Regulations has little value in determining the effect of a diplomatic
visa issued thereunder.
The effect of the diplomatic visa could have been more satisfactorily explained by reference to its significance in customary international law. Passports and visas are primarily travel documents and
it is doubtful if they confer any substantive rights, in the absence of
special treaty provisions, which are recognized in international law.20
They merely evidence the identity or status of the bearer. Although in
United States practice a ·diplomatic passport is both a travel document
and a certificate of the official identity of the bearer,27 it is not the
source of his status. Obviously his appointment, accreditation, acceptance, and duties give him diplomatic status. The diplomatic passport
is at most only prima facie evidence of the diplomatic status of the
bearer.
23 Brie£ for Defendant, 6-7.
24 Principal case, 88 F. Supp. 915 at 920. The court relied also on the certification of
the State Department. 22 CoDE FED. Rims. §40.4 (A) (1949) lists 15 classes of aliens
eligible to receive diplomatic visas.
25 DEPT. OF STATE AmE-MEMoIRE, April 28, 1949. See the principal case, 88 F.
Supp. 915 at 919. See also 3 HACKWORTH, D1GEST OF lm:ERNATIONAL LAw 452 (1942).
20 Diplock, "Passports and Protection in International Law," 32 GROT. Soc. TRANs.
for 1946, 42 at 58 (1947). Cf. 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF lNrERNATIONAL LAw 435-6

(1942).
21 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oF INTERNATIONAL LAw 452 (1942).
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At an earlier period in England passports were issued to nonnationals to show that the bearer had permission to travel in the issuing
state. Visas came to be used as convenient substitutes for this kind of
passport.28 They simply permitted and facilitated the travel of the
bearer, but did not constitute a grant of special protection. Here again,
the right to protection which exists under international law arises from
the nationality or status of the individual. As a matter of municipal
law, the right to enter a state may be conditioned on the possession of
whatever document it pleases, or not conditioned at all. 29 The United
States has chosen to facilitate official intercourse through the use of
diplomatic visas, but does not in so doing guarantee diplomatic status
and 'immunities ·to persons receiving diplomatic visas, in the absence
of any treaty or agreement. Such immunities result only from the
recognition by the State Department of the active diplomatic status of
the individual, either through an agreation, formal reception of the
envoy, or in the case of delegates to the United Nations the special
procedure provided in the Headquarters Agreement. The diplomatic
visa is simply an endorsement on a diplomatic or equivalent passport
authorizing the bearer's entry into the United States as a non-immigrant.30 It recognizes the authenticity of the passport and in practice
it may also be an acknowledgment that the bearer is prima facie entitled to recognition as a diplomat. But the acknowledgment is not
conclusive since the diplomatic visa may be cancelled or revoked under
certain circumstances.31 ~t seems clear that neither diplomatic passports nor diplomatic visas stamped thereon confer in themselves any
rights recognized in international law.32
28 Diplock, "Passports and Protection in International Law," 32 GnoT. Soc. TRANs.
for 1946, 42 at 50 (1947); WHEATON, lliTERNATIONAL LAw, §224 footnote (1886 text).
29 Diplock, "Passports and Protection in International Law," 32 GnoT. Soc. TRANs. for
1946, 42 at 57 (1947).
30 See Immigration Act of 1924 as amended, 43 Stat. L. 154, 8 U.S.C. (1946)
§§203, 215.
.
3122 CoDE FED. REcs. §40.14 (1949). Grounds for cancellation are obtaining the
visa by fraud, misrepresentation, or in other improper manner, or inadmissibility of the
holder into the United States.
32 See 1 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oF lliTERNATIONAL LAw 338·9 (1942). Issuance of
diplomatic visas to representatives of an unrecognized government (Russia) were said by
the Secretary of State to constitute neither precedent nor recognition of the existing regime
in Russia. The State Department has also expressed the opinion that, " ••• [S]uch an
official [of the League of Nations] would customarily be given a diplomatic visa on the basis
of his diplomatic passport and accorded the courtesies usually extended to holders of such
passports. You will appreciate the fact, however, that no assurance can be given that such
a visa -would be regarded as entitling the holder to the privileges and immunities of a diplomatic officer.•. .''. 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1927), p. 414 (1942).
(Emphasis added).
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III. Conclusiveness of a Certification by the State Department
It has becoine uniform practice for courts in the United States to
accept as conclusive the certification of the State Department that an
individual enjoys diplomatic status. A practical reason is that, ordinarily, recognition by the State Department is the ·best evidence of
accreditation by our govemment.33 Moreover, the judiciary defer to
the decisions of the executive branch of the government on political
questions. Since the Constitution commits the conduct of foreign
affairs to the executive department, diplomatic status is said to be a
political question which should be decided exclusively by the executive. 34 Gubitchev argued that neither of these considerations justified
the application of the rule of conclusiveness in his case because he did
not claim immunity through accreditation to our Government; hence
the State Department had no official knowledge or concern about his
status. But the State Department conducts our relations with the
United Nations, and is in fact directly concerned with the status of
foreign personnel under our agreements with the Unite_d Nations.35
The wisdom of giving conclusive effect to declarations by the State
Department of facts peculiarly within its knowledge is unquestionable.
But the courts increasingly tend to be bound also by conclusions of
law submitted by the State Department, which practice has provoked
some criticism.30 Ordinarily, the conclusion of exemption from juris33 United States v. Liddle, (D.C. Pa. 1808) F.C. 15, 598. In Sullivan v. State of
Sao Paulo, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 355, the court communicated with the State
Department until it elicited a staten,ent that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court then deemed that to be at least the best possible evidence. Cf. Musmann
v. Engelke, [1928] 1 K.B. 90 at 103.
34 United States v. Ortega, (C.C.A. Pa. 1825) 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,971. Letters
from the Secretary of State and the testimony of the chief clerk of the department of state,
recognizing an assaulted charge d'alfaires as a diplomatic official were there held to answer
conclusively arguments of non-immunity. The Court in In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 10 S.Ct.
854 (1890) denied a claim of immunity, giving some significance to the absence of a certificate of the State Department. The Court said that such a certificate would have been
enough to entitle the claimant to immunity. See also Carrera v. Carrera, (App. D.C., 1949)
174 F. (2d) 496.
3;; The International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat: L. 669 at §8 requires
acceptance by the Secretary of State as a condition precedent to the immunities therein contained. Section 15 of the Headquarters Agreement necessitates agreement among the Secretary-General, the United States, a:id the member nation concerned as to what resident
personnel other than the principal resident representative of a member nation shall be accorded the same immunities as diplomatic envoys.
3\l This tendency has been particularly apparent where the immunities of foreign
sovereigns and their property are in issue. See Jessup, "Has the Supreme Court Abdicated
One of its Functions?" 40 AM. J. lNr. L. 168 (1946); 97 UNIV. PA, L. REv. 79 (1948).
But cf. Lyons, "The Conclusiveness of the 'Suggestion' and Certificate of the American
State Department," 24 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 116 (1947). Mr. Lyons has also described tl1e
analogous practice in England; Lyons, "The Conclusiveness of the Foreign Office Certificate," 23 BmT. Y. B. !Nr. L. 240 (1946).
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diction follows automatically if the certification of immunity by the
State Department is accepted, and the court has no alternative but to
dismiss the a~tion. 37 In the principal case, however, the State Department certified that Gubitchev did not enjoy diplomatic status. Although the court called this the "dispositive fact," the precise weight
which it gave to the certification is not clear. The court considered the
arguments of the defendant and refuted them, apparently not content
to rely completely on the "dispositive fact." Judicial review in this
situation is clearly desirable and probably will not embarrass the
executive in its conduct of foreign affairs.38 Denial by the State Department of a claim to immunity subjects the claimant at least prima fade
to the jurisdiction of the court. The court is then free to inquire into
the claims without interfering with diplomatic intercourse, because
our Government has already decided that the claimant is not a recognized diplomat. Perhaps, in addition, the judiciary can prevent embarrassment to the State Department, if it appears that the State Department overlooked a valid basis for the claim.39
An even stronger case for judicial review exists where United
Nations personnel are involved. The status of United Nations officials
and delegates in the United States is determined exclusively by agreements and statutes.40 The construction and application of statutes and
treaties is ultimately a judicial function, and executive interpretation
is highly persuasive but not conclusive.41 Moreover, the general policy
embodied in the pertinent agreements. is not subject to unilateral
change by the executive department or by the courts;42 hence it is hard
to see how the courts could embarrass the executive by a judicial determination of questions of law arising under the agreements. In the
principal case, the first opinion of the court dealt with all the possible
87 See
38 But

1 OPPENHEIM-LAOTERPACHT, rnTERNATIONAL LAw, 7th ed., 724-5 (1948).
see Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 65 S.Ct. 530 (1944).
80 In the case of Wolf von Igel [FoREIGN RELATIONS OF nm UNITED STATES 807 at
810 (1916 Supp.)], Secretary of State Lansing intimated strongly that diplomatic immunity
might ncit protect von Igel because of the gravity of the crimes charged. Authorities seem
unanimous to the contrary. 2 HYDE, rnTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d rev. ed., _1266-7 (1945);
HERSEY, rnTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAw 288 (1912); 4 HACKWORTH, DrGEST oF rnTERNATIONAL LAw 515-527 (1942); 4 MooRB, rnTERNATioNAL LAW DxcEST 631-635 (1906).
40 The United States refuses to recognize any right of immunity existing under customary international law. Principal case, 84 F. Supp. 472 at 476 (1949).
41 Charlton v. Kelly, Sheriff, 229 U.S. 447 at 468, 33 S.Ct. 945 (1913); Sullivan v.
Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 at 442, 41 S.Ct. 158 (1921); 2 HYDE, rnTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d rev.
ed., 1484 (1945). Cf. 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF rnTI!RNATIONAL LAw 48-9 (1942). The
Headquarters Agreement on approval by Congress has the full legal effect of a treaty. 15
DEPT. STATE BoLL. 1068 (1946).
4 2 See 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oF rnTERNATIONAL LAw 268-269 (1942).

1950]

COMMENTS

109

statutory sources of immunity. Similar cases, however, categorically
approve the rule of conclusiveness, although they generally cite the
applicable agreement and take notice that in fact the person claiming
immunity is covered thereby.43
This tendency to give conclusive effect to State Department decisions is not wholly justi.6ed by the terms of the Headquarters Agreement. Section 7(c) vests jurisdiction in federal, state, and local courts
over acts done in the Headquarters District, except as otherwise provided in the agreement. Section 13(b)(l) contemplates deportation
proceedings which may be instituted with the approval of the Secretary
of State. On the other hand, the agreement provides for settlement of
disputes between the United States and the United Nations concerning the construction or application of the agreement ''by negotiation or
other agreed mode of settlement," by arbitration, or by advisory opinion
of the International Court of Justice, which is then made binding in
the arbitration. This provision, however, does not touch disputes
between the United States and other member nations and had no
application to the principal case. None of the provisions of the Agreement necessitate the abdication of judicial functions by the courts.

IV. Conclusion
The political consequences of the Gubitchev case have overshadowed the problems of international and municipal law that it
presented. Congressional apprehension of further security leaks in
the State Department has resulted in renewed accusations and investigations, which have weakened public con.6dence in our foreign policy
and in the people who are responsible for its execution. Secretary of
State Acheson was accused of ''bungling" the affair because he had
Gubitchev's sentence suspended.44 The case provided excellent propaganda for the Russian press, which charged that the evidence was
illegally obtained,4 5 that the decision violated basic principles of inter4B Tsiang v. Tsiang, 86 N.Y.S. (2d) 556 (1949); Friedberg v. Santa Cruz, 86 N.Y.S.
(2d) 360 (1949); City of New Rochelle v. Page-Sharp, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 290 (1949); Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S. (2d) 206 (1947). In the Friedborg case the court held
that it was deprived of jurisdiction over the Chilean permanent representative to the United
Nations and his wife by the Headquarters Agreement, construed in conjunction with the provision of the Judicial Code which vested original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions
against ambassadors of foreign states in the Supreme Court. In Westchester County v.
Ranallo, 67 N.Y.S. (2d) 31 (1946), the court held the driver of Sec.-Gen. Lie's automobile
not entitled to immunity under the International Organizations Immunities Act, but stated
that the question of immunity should be decided by the State Department, not by the courts.
44 N.Y. T1MEs, March 11, 1950, p. 5: I.
45 See United States v. Coplon, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 88 F. Supp. 921.
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national law, that the court subserved the purposes of the Department
of Justice, and that the court recommended Gubitchev's departure
beca~se the charges of the prosecution collapsed.40 . One writer suggested that the grave violation of international law justified Russian
·reparation or reprisal against citizens or diplomatic officers of the United
States.47 Diplomatic relations between our government and Russia
must inevitably have become more strained than ever because of" the
refusal of the State Department to accede to the Russian claim of
immunity.
·
The decision of the principal case restricts the. immunities of United
Nations personnel, in accordance with the mutual understanding of
our government and the United Nations, to those provided for in the
Headquarters Agreement and the International Organizations Immunities Act. 48 The dangers which would result from exempting a large
number of employees of the United Nations from local jurisdiction
are apparent. In view of the fact that the policies concerning jurisdictional immunities are spelled out in these agreements, it seems clear
that the courts are competent to determine questions of immunity
arising thereunder, and should not in all cases accept as conclusive the
word of the State Department. That the judiciary refuses to exercise ·
its jurisdiction may be in part another manifestation of the present
trend t~ward "realism" and power politics, and away from "sterile"
principles of international law.40
Melvin J. Spencer, S.Ed.
40 See 2 CURRENT DIGEST OF nm SOVIET PRESS, March 18, 1950, p. 30:1; 5 SOVIET
P.REss TRANSLATIONS, April 1, 1950, p. 223, supra, note 6.
4 7 Professor Korovin, Russian expert in international law. N.Y. Tn.ras, April 28,
1949, p. 16:7.
.
48 Although the United States has not yet acceded to the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations, 43 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1949 Supp.), the Convention is
defined in section 1 (c) of the Headquarters Agreement, "as acceded to by the United
States." Section 26 provides that the Agreement and the Convention shall be treated as
complementary. Apparently, thei:e provisions are not considered as incorporating the Convention into the Headquarters Agreement or as an accession by implication.
40 Josef L. Kunz discusses the general trend in "The Swing of the Pendulum: From
Overestimation to Underestimation of International Law," 44 AM. J. L."'IT. L. 135 (1950).

